This paper examines a dynamic model of nonlinear income taxation in which the government cannot commit to its future tax policy, and individuals are quasihyperbolic discounters who cannot commit to future consumption plans. The government uses its taxation powers to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function that re ‡ects individuals' true (long-run) preferences. Under …rst-best taxation, quasi-hyperbolic discounting exerts no e¤ect on the level of social welfare attainable. Under second-best taxation, quasi-hyperbolic discounting increases (resp. decreases) the level of social welfare attainable when separating (resp. pooling) taxation is optimal. Interestingly, this implies that some individuals can actually be better-o¤ in the long run as a result of their short-run impatience. The e¤ects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting on the optimal marginal tax rates applicable to labor income and savings are also explored.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine the e¤ects of incorporating quasi-hyperbolic discounting by individuals into a dynamic model of optimal nonlinear income taxation without commitment. There is by now an extensive empirical and theoretical literature on quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which captures a preference many individuals have for immediate grati…cation. 1 This leads agents to make short-run decisions that they later regret as not being consistent with their long-run preferences. Such behavior is often described as an individual imposing a negative "internality" on their future self, which potentially justi…es corrective (or paternalistic) policy intervention. 2 There is, in e¤ect, preference heterogeneity between individuals and the government, as the government's preferences are the same as individuals' long-run preferences, but not their short-run preferences. In our model economy, an individual's need for immediate grati…cation leads them to make labor, consumption and savings decisions that are not in their longrun interest. The policy instrument available to the government to o¤set the e¤ects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting is dynamic nonlinear income taxation, applicable to both labor and savings.
There is currently a great deal of interest in dynamic nonlinear income taxation, such as the "new dynamic public …nance" literature that extends the static Mirrlees [1971] model of optimal nonlinear income taxation to a dynamic setting. 3 The second-best nature of the Mirrlees model stems entirely from the assumption that an individual's skill type is private information, which is what prevents the government from implementing …rst-best taxation based on skills as the Second Welfare Theorem would recommend.
In dynamic versions of the Mirrlees model, however, taxation in earlier periods may result in skill-type information being revealed to the government, which would then enable …rst-best taxation in latter periods. To avoid this possibility and some associated complications, the new dynamic public …nance literature typically assumes that the government can commit to its future tax policy. That is, the government continues to implement second-best (incentive-compatible) taxation even after skill-type information has been revealed. However, the commitment assumption overlooks an important feature of the Mirrlees approach to optimal taxation-that no ad hoc constraints be placed on the nature of the optimal tax function, and that the tax instruments available to the government be constrained only by the information structure. Indeed, one of the motives behind the development of the new dynamic public …nance literature is to avoid the need for ad hoc constraints on the tax system, as are typically imposed in the classic representative-agent Ramsey model (see Golosov, et al. [2006] ). Therefore, we assume that the government cannot commit to its future tax policy. This means that both individuals and the government in our model cannot commit to future plans, though both would be better-o¤ in the long run if they were able to do so.
The main complication associated with relaxing the commitment assumption is that it may no longer be social-welfare maximizing for the government to design a (separating) nonlinear income tax system in which individuals are willing to reveal their skill types.
Instead, it may be optimal to pool the individuals so that skill-type information is not revealed. 4 To minimize the problems that the possible optimality of separating or pooling taxation present, we adopt the two-type (high-skill and low-skill) version of the Mirrlees model introduced by Stiglitz [1982] , 5 and analyze a three-period model, which is the shortest time horizon that can capture the e¤ects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Individuals work and save in periods 1 and 2, and live-o¤ their second-period savings in period 3. The government imposes nonlinear taxation on labor and savings in periods 1 and 2 such that a utilitarian social welfare function based on individuals'true (long- 4 The reason that either separating or pooling taxation may be optimal when the government cannot commit is explained in detail in Section 4. 5 It does not seem feasible to consider more than two types of individuals, because the number of tax regimes that must be considered increases exponentially. For example, assuming merely three types results in …ve regimes: complete separation, complete pooling, and three cases of pooling two types against the remaining type. Moreover, even in the two-type model that we study, there is a third possibility of partial pooling in which some, but not all, of the high-skill individuals are pooled with the low-skill individuals. However, for the sake of analytical simplicity, we restrict attention to the "pure strategy" policies of complete separating or pooling taxation. run) preferences is maximized. Hence, the social welfare function captures a corrective motive for dynamic taxation, as well as the usual redistributive motive embedded in utilitarianism.
Our main result is that quasi-hyperbolic discounting increases the level of social welfare attainable when separating taxation is optimal, but decreases social welfare when pooling is optimal. This implies that, under separating taxation, at least one type of individuals are actually better-o¤ in the long run as a result of their short-run impatience.
This …nding stands in stark contrast to the usual result that quasi-hyperbolic discounting makes individuals worse-o¤ in the long run. The intuition for our result, in a nutshell, can be summarized as follows. Nonlinear income taxation gives the government the power to ensure that only two allocations, one intended for low-skill individuals and the other intended for high-skill individuals, may potentially be chosen, by making the tax burden associated with all other allocations su¢ ciently severe. This, in e¤ect, means that the government can override the individuals' short-run (quasi-hyperbolic) preferences. The only challenge then that the government faces is to ensure that each type chooses the allocation intended for them. Given the government's redistributive objective, low-skill individuals will never want to choose the high-skill type's allocation, but high-skill individuals may want to mimic low-skill individuals by choosing their allocation. The government can deter mimicking behavior by making sure that the allocations o¤ered satisfy the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint. Quasihyperbolic discounting does, however, a¤ect the incentive-compatibility constraint, since high-skill individuals will compare the high-skill and low-skill allocations using their short-run preferences. We then show that quasi-hyperbolic discounting relaxes the highskill type's incentive-compatibility constraint under separating taxation, but tightens it under pooling taxation. It also follows from the preceding discussion that quasihyperbolic discounting exerts no e¤ect on social welfare under …rst-best taxation, since in this case the allocations need not be incentive compatible. Finally, we explore the e¤ects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting on the optimal marginal tax rates applicable to labor income and savings, both analytically and numerically. This paper complements a recent literature that examines labor and savings/capital taxation in dynamic Mirrlees-style models. However, unlike the previous literature, our paper does not seek to make a new argument in favor of savings/capital taxation. What distinguishes this work from all of these studies is our focus on the e¤ects of incorporating quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and how such behavior can actually raise long-run utility and social welfare. Brett and Weymark [2008] and Farhi, et al. [2012] examine the optimality of nonlinear savings/capital taxation in dynamic Mirrlees models without commitment. Brett and Weymark examine a two-type, two-period model in which the tax instruments available to the government are constrained only by asymmetric information regarding skills, as in the standard Mirrlees framework. 6 They highlight the possibilities that separating or pooling taxation can be social-welfare maximizing, and derive the optimal marginal tax rates applicable to savings under each regime. Farhi, et al. examine a model with a continuum of types, and they consider both two-period and in…nite-horizon settings. In their model, taxation is constrained by asymmetric information regarding skills and by political-economy constraints, which take the form of direct or reputational costs of implementing tax reforms. This results in a "limited commitment" setting in which full redistribution is never implemented. Their main conclusion is that the optimal taxation of capital is progressive.
The models examined by Golosov, et Tuomala consider a similar setting to Diamond and Spinnewijn, but they do not assume jobs are skill speci…c. Instead, they mainly focus on numerical solutions to the multidimensional screening problem. They also examine the possibility that the government's discount factor may di¤er from that of individuals, which creates a paternalistic motive for taxation. Their analysis also provides a rationale for savings taxation. Bassi also assumes full commitment by the government, but individuals are quasi-hyperbolic discounters who di¤er in the degree of discounting. Therefore, like the related literature,
Bassi focuses on the multi-dimensional screening problem and his analysis makes a case for taxing savings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the analytical framework that we consider. Section 3 examines …rst-best nonlinear taxation, while Section 4 examines second-best nonlinear taxation. Section 5 presents some numerical simulations to further highlight the e¤ects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Section 6 concludes, while proofs are relegated to an appendix.
Analytical Framework
The economy is assumed to last for three periods. 7 There is a continuum of individuals of unit measure who live for the three periods, with a proportion 2 (0; 1) being highskill workers and the remainder (1 ) being low-skill workers. The wage rates of the high-skill and low-skill individuals are denoted by w H and w L respectively, where
Wages are assumed to remain constant through time.
Individuals work and save in periods 1 and 2. In period 3, which can be thought of 7 We consider a …nite-horizon model because the no-commitment problems faced by individuals and the government are both most easily solved by backwards induction, and as discussed earlier three periods are the shortest time horizon that can capture the e¤ects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
as the retirement period, individuals do not work and must live-o¤ their second-period savings. Therefore, savings decisions made in period 2 completely determine the outcome in period 3. Individual i's true (long-run) utility function is given by:
where c t i is individual i's consumption in period t, l t i is individual i's labor supply in period t, and 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. The function u( ) is increasing and strictly concave, while v( ) is increasing and strictly convex.
Since individuals are quasi-hyperbolic discounters, they do not act to maximize (2.1).
Instead, following Laibson [1997] , their objective function is better described by the utility function:
where 2 (0; 1) captures the e¤ects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. When viewed from period 1, it can be seen that an individual's discount factor between periods 1 and 2 is , while between periods 2 and 3 it is . But when viewed from period 2, the discount factor between periods 2 and 3 is . Thus (2.2) captures a preference for immediate grati…cation that leads individuals to make short-run consumption, savings, and labor supply decisions that are not consistent with long-run utility maximization.
Individual Behavior Without Taxation
In this subsection, we describe how individuals would behave in the absence of taxation.
The literature on quasi-hyperbolic discounting has distinguished between naive agents and sophisticated agents. Naive agents are aware of their need for immediate grati…ca-tion, but they (naively) think that in the future they will behave in a manner consistent with their long-run preferences. On the other hand, sophisticated agents are aware of their need for immediate grati…cation, and they are also aware that they will feel this need again in the future. We assume that individuals are sophisticated. 8 In this case, 8 Making the alternative assumption that individuals are naive would have no e¤ect on our qualitative conclusions. There would, however, be some minor e¤ects on our quantitative results. We assume that individuals are sophisticated because, as O'Donoghue and Rabin [1999] and Diamond and Koszegi [2003] point out, it is consistent with the usual assumption in economics that individuals are rational. 
subject to the budget constraint:
It is shown in the Appendix that the solutions to programs (2:3) (2:4) and (2:5) (2:6) yield the following marginal conditions between labor and consumption in period t, and between consumption in periods t and t + 1 (for t = 1; 2):
Since 6 = 1, it follows that the allocation implied by the marginal conditions in (2.7) di¤ers from what would be optimal according to the individual's true utility function (2.1). Therefore, under laissez faire, quasi-hyperbolic discounting makes each individual worse-o¤ in the long run, which implies that any welfarist-based measure of social welfare would also be lower in the long run.
Implicit Marginal Tax Rates
As we assume that the government can impose nonlinear taxes on an individual's income from labor and savings, it may be optimal for the government to set taxes to induce violations of the marginal conditions shown in equation (2.7). Following the standard practice, one may interpret these marginal distortions as tax wedges or implicit marginal tax rates. Accordingly, we de…ne:
where M T RL t i denotes the (implicit) marginal tax rate on labor faced by individual i in period t, and M T RS t i denotes the (implicit) marginal tax rate on savings faced by individual i in period t (where t = 1; 2).
First-Best Taxation
We begin with the hypothetical case in which the government knows each individual's skill type in all three periods. In this case, the government's choice of an optimal nonlinear tax system applicable to labor income and savings is equivalent to it choosing H i for the lowskill and high-skill individuals, respectively, to maximize:
where m i . Equation 9 Recall that individuals do not work in period 3. Thus savings decisions made in period 2 completely determine the outcome in period 3.
(3.1) is a utilitarian social welfare function based on each type's true (long-run) utility function (2.1), which re ‡ects the assumption that the government has a corrective (or paternalistic) objective in setting taxes. Equations (3.2) and (3.3) are, respectively, the government's …rst-and second-period budget constraints. Implicit in equations (3.2) and (3.3) is the simplifying assumption that the government cannot save or borrow.
Since it is currently postulated that the government can observe each individual's type from period 1 onwards, it does not face any incentive-compatibility constraints.
It is shown in the Appendix that the solution to program (3:1) (3:3) yields:
Proposition 1 Under …rst-best taxation: (i) quasi-hyperbolic discounting has no effect on the level of social welfare attainable,
The result that quasi-hyperbolic discounting exerts no e¤ect on the level of social welfare attainable under …rst-best taxation follows simply from the fact that the quasihyperbolic discounting parameter, , does not appear in program (3:1) (3:3). This is because …rst-best nonlinear taxation gives the government the power to force each type i to choose hm However, both types face negative marginal tax rates on their savings. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting implies that individuals would choose to save less than they should according to their long-run preferences. Therefore, optimal nonlinear taxation distorts each type's savings upwards via negative marginal tax rates to correct the e¤ects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Second-Best Taxation
In this section, we examine nonlinear labor and savings taxation when the government cannot observe each individual's skill type. Incentive-compatibility constraints must now be considered, and heterogeneity between individuals'short-run and long-run preferences now plays a role. Taxation in period 1, however, may result in skill-type information being revealed to the government, which would then enable it to implement …rst-best taxation in period 2. Since all individuals know that if they reveal their type in period 1 they will be subjected to …rst-best taxation in period 2, they may have to be compensated in period 1 if they are to be willing to reveal their type. This compensation is potentially very costly from the government's perspective of maximizing social welfare. Accordingly, rather than designing a "separating" tax system in period 1 in which individuals are willing to reveal their types, it may be optimal for the government to use "pooling" taxation in which type information is not revealed, even though it is then constrained to use second-best taxation in period 2. It is theoretically possible for either the separating or pooling tax systems to be social-welfare maximizing, depending upon the parameters of the model. 10 Therefore, we examine in turn the nature of separating and pooling nonlinear labor and savings taxation.
Separating Taxation
If the tax system is designed to separate the high-skill individuals from the low-skill individuals in period 1, the government has enough information to implement …rst-best taxation in period 2. The government's behavior in period 2 can then be described as follows. Choose allocations hm H i for the low-skill and high-skill individuals, respectively, to maximize:
subject to:
where (4.1) is a utilitarian social welfare function which re ‡ects each type's true utility over periods 2 and 3, while (4.2) is the government's second-period budget constraint.
The solution to program (4:1) (4:2) yields the functions m
H ( ), and s 2 H ( ). Substituting these functions into (4.1) yields the value function Z 2 F ( ), with the subscript F indicating that the value function is associated with a …rst-best taxation problem.
In period 1, the government cannot distinguish high-skill from low-skill individuals, but it designs a separating tax system in order to obtain skill-type information. Accordingly, the government chooses allocations hm 
where:
and:
Equation (4.3) is a utilitarian social welfare function, which takes into account how savings decisions made in period 1 a¤ect the level of social welfare attainable over periods 2 and 3. Equation (4.3) therefore includes the value function Z 2 F ( ). Equation (4.4) is the government's …rst-period budget constraint, while (4.5) is the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint. In order for a high-skill individual to be willing to reveal their type, the utility they obtain from choosing hm Notice that the low-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint is omitted, because
we focus on what Stiglitz [1982] calls the "normal" case and what Guesnerie [1995] calls "redistributive equilibria". Speci…cally, we make the standard assumption that the parameters of the model are such that the government will be seeking to redistribute from high-skill to low-skill individuals. This implies that high-skill individuals have an incentive to mimic low-skill individuals, but not vice versa. Therefore, the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint will bind at an optimum, whereas the low-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint will be slack.
It is shown in the Appendix that the solutions to programs (4:1) (4:2) and (4:3) (4:5) together imply:
Proposition 2 Under second-best taxation with separation in the …rst period: (i) quasihyperbolic discounting increases the level of social welfare attainable,
Interestingly, quasi-hyperbolic discounting increases the level of social welfare attainable, even though it calls for corrective action which requires inducing marginal distortions. The intuition for this result is two-fold. First, nonlinear taxation gives the government the power to ensure that either the hm This follows from a well-known, though somewhat strange, feature of …rst-best taxation, i.e., individual utility is decreasing with respect to the wage rate. This is because under …rst-best taxation, it is optimal to give both types the same level of consumption, but high-skill individuals are required to work longer. 11 Accordingly, high-skill individuals must be o¤ered a relatively favorable tax treatment in period 1 if they are to reveal their type, in order to compensate them for the very unfavorable tax treatment they will face under …rst-best taxation in period 2. However, quasi-hyperbolic discounting means that in period 1 high-skill individuals care less than they should about the utility they obtain in periods 2 and 3. Therefore, high-skill individuals require less compensation in period 1 to reveal their type, which in turn enables the government to attain a higher level of social welfare.
In period 1, high-skill individuals face a zero marginal tax rate on their labor income, while that for low-skill individuals is positive. These are the well-known "no-distortionat-the-top" and "downward-distortion-at-the-bottom" results that typify second-best nonlinear income taxation. Likewise, both types face zero marginal tax rates on labor income in period 2 simply because …rst-best taxation is used in that period.
Low-skill individuals face a negative marginal tax rate on savings in period 1 for two reasons. First, quasi-hyperbolic discounting means that they want to save less than they should; thus the government distorts their savings upwards to correct this e¤ect.
Second, distorting savings by low-skill individuals upwards relaxes the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint. To see this, note that under …rst-best taxation in period 2, the government will choose allocations such that u 0 (m 12 Now since u( ) is strictly concave, an increase in s 1 L will reduce the low-skill type's marginal utility of consumption relative to that for the high-skill type, meaning the government can raise social welfare by transferring income from low-skill to high-skill individuals. It follows that an increase in s 1 L makes high-skill individuals better-o¤ under …rst-best taxation in period 2. This in turn makes them more willing to reveal their type in period 1, or equivalently the incentive-compatibility constraint is relaxed.
The sign of the marginal tax rate on savings faced by high-skill individuals in period 1 is ambiguous. On the one hand, the government wants to distort their savings upwards to correct the e¤ects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. But on the other hand, the government wants to distort their savings downwards to relax the incentive-compatibility constraint; the intuition for this follows by mirroring the argument just made for increasing the low-skill type's savings to relax the incentive-compatibility constraint. Finally, both types face negative marginal tax rates on their second-period savings, equal to ( 1)= . This is because …rst-best taxation is used in period 2, so as in Proposition 1
there is only the corrective motive for inducing marginal savings distortions.
Pooling Taxation
If the tax system pools the individuals in period 1, the government cannot distinguish high-skill from low-skill individuals in period 2. Therefore, in period 2 the government must solve a second-best (information constrained) optimal nonlinear income tax problem. As this problem is essentially a static optimal nonlinear income tax problem, separating taxation is optimal. The government therefore chooses allocations hm 
where s 1 denotes the …rst-period savings of both types under pooling in period 1. Equation (4.8) is a utilitarian social welfare function, (4.9) is the government's second-period budget constraint, and (4.10) is the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint.
In period 2 the government cannot distinguish high-skill from low-skill individuals, so the allocations must be incentive compatible. 13 Since high-skill individuals are free to choose between hm In period 1 the government implements pooling taxation. Therefore, it chooses a single allocation hm 1 ; y 1 ; s 1 i for all individuals to maximize: 13 We again omit the low-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint because, given the government's redistributive objective, it will not be binding.
and M T RS
When pooling in period 1 is optimal, quasi-hyperbolic discounting reduces the level of social welfare attainable. This is because, unlike in the separating case, quasi-hyperbolic discounting under pooling tightens the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint. The intuition is as follows. Under …rst-best taxation, it is optimal to equate In period 1, low-skill individuals face a negative marginal tax rate on their labor income, while that for high-skill individuals is positive. To understand these results, note that in the absence of taxation high-skill individuals would choose to earn more income than low-skill individuals (as both types have the same preferences, but w H > w L ).
When both types are subjected to the same allocation under pooling in period 1, the government, in e¤ect, chooses y 1 based on a weighted average of w L and w H . This results in the low-skill (resp. high-skill) type's labor supply being distorted upwards (resp. downwards) to earn y 1 . In period 2 the usual pattern of optimal marginal tax rates on labor income applies, because in period 2 the government essentially solves a standard second-best optimal nonlinear income tax problem.
The sign of the marginal tax rate on savings faced by low-skill individuals in period 1 is ambiguous, while that for high-skill individuals is negative. This is because in period 2 it is optimal to set c But concurrently, the government wants to distort both types'…rst-period savings upwards to o¤set the e¤ects of quasihyperbolic discounting. Thus the two motives for marginal distortions work in opposite directions for low-skill individuals, rendering their optimal marginal tax rate on …rst-period savings ambiguous; whereas both motives encourage an upward distortion to high-skill individuals'…rst-period savings, making a negative marginal tax rate optimal.
In period 2, both types face negative marginal tax rates on their savings, in order to correct the e¤ects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. However, the subsidy for lowskill individuals is larger, because the further upward distortion to their second-period savings makes it easier to implement c 2 H > c 2 L , which again helps relax the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint.
Numerical Simulations
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of varying the quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameter, . Ideally, these comparative statics results could be derived analytically; however the literature on the comparative statics of optimal nonlinear income taxes has found that analytical results are generally obtainable only when the utility function is quasilinear. 14 We therefore calibrate our model with empirically-plausible parameter values, and then use numerical simulations to examine the e¤ects of changing . To this end, we postulate that:
where > 0. Chetty [2006] concludes that a reasonable estimate of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is one (i.e., = 1); hence our assumption that utility is logarithmic in consumption. And we set = 2, as this implies a labor supply elasticity of 0.5 which is in line with empirical estimates (see, e.g., Chetty, et al.
[2011]). Table 1 presents the remaining parameter values. The OECD [2010] reports that on average across OECD countries, approximately one-quarter of all adults have attained tertiary level education. We therefore assume that 25% of individuals are high-skill workers, i.e., we set = 0:25. We assume an annual interest rate of r = 0:05, which is consistent with common practice, and that the long-run discount factor is equal to 1=(1 + r). Since most individuals work for around 40 years of their lives, we take each period to be 20 years in length. An annual discount rate of 5% then corresponds to a 20-year discount factor of = 0:38. Fang [2006] and Goldin and Katz [2007] estimate that the college wage premium is approximately 60%. We therefore normalize the low-skill type's wage to unity, and set the high-skill type's wage equal to 1.6. Finally, we begin with an arbitrary baseline value of = 0:85, and then examine the e¤ects of varying between 0:75 0:95 on each type's true (long-run) utility and on the optimal marginal tax rates, 15 holding all other parameters at their baseline levels. These e¤ects are shown in Figure 1 for separating taxation, and in Figure 2 for pooling taxation.
In Figure 1 , it can be seen that social welfare under separating taxation is decreasing in or, equivalently, increasing in the degree of quasi-hyperbolic discounting (cf. Proposition 2). High-skill individuals are better-o¤ as increases, while low-skill individuals are worse-o¤. As discussed earlier, an increase in under separating taxation tightens the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint. Thus high-skill individuals must be o¤ered a more attractive tax treatment, which comes at the expense of low-skill individuals. Next, the optimal marginal tax rate applicable to the low-skill type's labor income in period 1 is increasing in . As in the standard Mirrlees model, low-skill individuals face a positive marginal tax rate on their labor income to relax the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint. Since in our model an increase in tightens the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint, low-skill individuals must face a higher marginal tax rate on their labor income. Furthermore, the marginal tax rates for both types on their …rst-period savings are increasing in , simply because the need to correct the e¤ects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting is attenuated. While the sign of the high-skill type's optimal marginal tax rate on …rst-period savings is theoretically ambiguous, in our numerical simulations it is positive. This indicates that the motive the government has to distort their savings downwards to relax the incentive-compatibility constraint outweighs the motive it has to distort their savings upwards to o¤set the 15 The e¤ects of varying on all non-zero marginal tax rates are explored, except for those equal to ( 1)= because the e¤ect in this case is obvious.
e¤ects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
In Figure 2 , which covers pooling taxation, social welfare is increasing in (cf.
Proposition 3). Mirroring the results under separating taxation, high-skill individuals are
worse-o¤ as increases, while low-skill individuals are better-o¤, because an increase in under pooling taxation relaxes the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint.
Moreover, the optimal marginal tax rates on labor income in period 1 for both types are independent of . Since pooling takes place in period 1, there are no incentivecompatibility constraints in the …rst period; hence changes in have no e¤ect on the …rst-period marginal tax rates applicable to labor income. In period 2, the low-skill type's marginal tax rate on labor income is decreasing in , because period 2 is when the government faces the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint. As increases in relax the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint, the government can reduce the marginal tax rate applicable to the low-skill type's labor income. Finally, the marginal tax rates on savings for both types in both periods are increasing in , again simply because the need to correct the e¤ects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting is attenuated. Although the sign of the low-skill type's …rst-period marginal tax rate on savings is theoretically ambiguous, in our numerical simulations it is negative, indicating that the corrective motive vis-a-vis quasi-hyperbolic discounting for marginal savings distortions dominates the redistributive motive vis-a-vis the high-skill type's incentivecompatibility constraint. The marginal tax rates on savings for both types in period 2 approach zero as rises, because there is only the corrective motive for inducing marginal savings distortions. However, for lower values of the savings subsidy for low-skill individuals increases relative to that for high-skill individuals, because this makes it easier for the government to satisfy the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint.
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined, both theoretically and numerically, the e¤ects of incorporating quasi-hyperbolic discounting by individuals into a dynamic model of optimal nonlinear income taxation without commitment. Although quasi-hyperbolic discounting calls for marginal tax distortions to correct its e¤ects, social welfare is not necessarily reduced. In fact, when separating taxation is optimal, quasi-hyperbolic discounting raises the level of social welfare attainable.
Two extensions of our work immediately come to mind. The …rst would be to extend the model to more than two types, but as discussed earlier this does not seem feasible as the number of possible tax regimes increases exponentially. Nevertheless, by imposing additional structure on the model to restrict the number of potentially optimal tax regimes, it may be possible to examine the many-type case. The second extension would be to move beyond three periods, and possibly to an in…nite-horizon setting. One does, however, run into the same problem as going to more than two types, in that the number of possible tax regimes increases. 16 But again, imposing additional restrictions on the model may make analysis of the many-period or in…nite-horizon settings feasible.
Appendix Individual Behavior Without Taxation
The Lagrangian corresponding to program (2:3) (2:4) is:
where 2 > 0 and 3 > 0 are Lagrange multipliers. The relevant …rst-order conditions can be written as:
The relevant …rst-order conditions corresponding to program (2:5) (2:6) are:
where 1 > 0 is the multiplier on the …rst-period budget constraint (2.6). By application of the Envelope Theorem:
Straightforward manipulation of (A:2) (A:9) leads to equation (2.7).
Proof of Proposition 1
Part ( 
Equation (A.10) can be rewritten as:
Dividing both sides of (A.14) by (1 + r)u 0 (c 2 L ) yields:
Analogous manipulations of (A.11), (A.12) and (A.13) establish that M T RS
Proof of Proposition 2
To prove part (i), the Lagrangian associated with program (4:3) (4:5) is: 
where W S ( ) denotes the level of social welfare attainable under separating taxation, and use has been made of the facts that @U 
where 2 > 0 is the multiplier on the government's second-period budget constraint 
The Lagrangian for program (4:1) (4:2) is:
By the Envelope Theorem: 
where use has also been made of the facts that c 
. By applying the Implicit Function
Theorem and Cramer's Rule to (A:18) (A:24) it can be shown that: can be written as, respectively: 
